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India reduced poverty during the 1990s. However, since
income inequality increased at the same time and in a generalised
way, the momentum on poverty reduction might decline in the future.*
Only employment-intensive growth will make continued poverty-
reduction attainable. Again, the prospects for a strong employment
generation process are not bright. The capacity to create jobs in tandem
with production in manufacturing fell in the 1990s. It is only in services
where urban employment has been growing rapidly. That confines the
majority to depend upon India’s slow-growing agriculture for a source
of income. Agriculture still accounts for 59% of total employment.
Most poor families are in casual employment or self-employed, while
those with regular employment are least likely to be poor.
Thus, direct action by the government to spark job creation could
dramatically reduce rural poverty. The government has introduced a
bill in parliament providing a minimum guarantee of employment to
poor households. The proposal is to give a statutory right to 100 days
a year of employment at the minimum wage in each state to one person
per household. On the basis of a minimum wage for all states of R$ 60 per
day, 100 days work will raise two-thirds of India’s population above the
poverty line. It will initially cover the 150 poorest districts in the country.
The scheme can bring a number of benefits. In fact, labour-intensity can
be very high in such work as watershed development, land regeneration,
and prevention of soil erosion. This would protect the environment, but
also enhance land productivity and increase output in  future.
It would also have positive second-round effects on incomes, by
raising rural wages and thus investment in human capital. One reason
children of poor parents drop out of school is because they cannot afford
schooling costs; raising incomes would reduce school drop outs. Add to
this the increase in land productivity – together these can have profound
economic growth effects.
Besides, improving watershed development could reduce damage to
life and property caused by frequent flooding, and save future costs in
government flood relief. The benefits of the employment guarantee
scheme spread beyond its immediate impact on poverty.
Over the long run, the bill’s implementation would not obviate the need
for transfer of labour out of agriculture, where few have regular
employment; most are self-employed or casual labourers.  Much of the
new regular wage jobs should be for low-skilled workers. This implies
a growth strategy of manufactured exports requiring low-skilled labour,
and producing low-skill intensity goods for the domestic market – rather
unlike the current strategy.
But with a 222 million work force in agriculture, even a fast transfer
out of agriculture will not pull all the working poor out of poverty.
Hence direct employment creation through the act is an essential
component of policy.
Is the employment guarantee scheme feasible? The economist
Jean Dreze has estimated the total cost of the programme with phased
implementation rises from 0.5% of GDP in the first year (2005) to 1% of
GDP in the last year of the inception phase (2008). Thereafter, the ratio
will decrease, as the number of below-poverty line households
decreases. The consolidation of existing employment generation
schemes with the programme of employment guarantee  will increase
efficiency in resource use.
The scheme, and these costs, are modelled on a similar scheme
implemented successfully for 20 years in Maharashtra. But the
preceding calculations assume a labour-material ratio of 60:40.
The corresponding ratio is much lower in Maharastra, and unit
costs could come down with more labour intensity.
These costs are not outrageously high but they are not low either.
However, reverting the downward trend on the already low tax base
of India will provide enough resources to pay for the employment
guarantee act. Compared to central tax revenues for low-income
countries of 14.1% of GDP over 1990-2001, or 22 for China in 2003,
India’s centre collected around 9% of GDP average between 2001
and 2004. Despite rising incomes in India the ratio of central taxes
to GDP has actually fallen from 10.6% in 1987/8 to 9.3% now.
There are still at least 200 million poor people in India, and increasing
inequality could lead to serious social tensions and urban turbulence.
The social consequences of rising inequality in India in the midst of 200
million poor – a given if the current pattern of jobless growth continues –
can be dire. There is a case for direct government intervention to create
jobs: the employment guarantee act might be a good option.
* Nota bene: See Kakwani’s One Pager 2 on the debate on poverty and inequality in India.
                      (OnePager’s editors).